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FORUM 42: CHILDREN AS SUBJECTS
A b s t r a c t :  This discussion is dedicated to the question of whether it is possible to overcome the power asymmetry 
between researchers and their subjects in the study of childhood, or at the very least to reduce the gulf between researchers 
and the objects of their studies. The ‘new sociology of childhood’ places the individual personality of the child and 
his / her personal interests at the centre of scholarly investigation, though its central presuppositions remain in some 
respects controversial. The focus on children’s subjectivity in academic work is related to the public acknowledgement of 
children’s agency as political and legal subjects. In this framework, the participants discuss the ethical and methodological 
problems related to work with children as subjects in childhood studies.
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Forum 42: Children as Subjects
This discussion is dedicated to the question of whether it is possible to overcome the power asymmetry between researchers 
and their subjects in the study of childhood, or at the very least to reduce the gulf between researchers and the objects 
of their studies. The ‘new sociology of childhood’ places the individual personality of the child and his / her personal 
interests at the centre of scholarly investigation, though its central presuppositions remain in some respects controversial. 
The focus on children’s subjectivity in academic work is related to the public acknowledgement of children’s agency as 
political and legal subjects. In this framework, the participants discuss the ethical and methodological problems related 
to work with children as subjects in сhildhood studies.
Keywords: children’s subjectivity, the ‘new sociology of childhood’, childhood studies.
EDITORS’ QUESTIONS
In the early 1990s, advocates of the ‘new socio-
logy of childhood’ were able to demonstrate that 
the infl uence of developmental psychology on 
sociological theories of child development 
had led to the conceptualisation of children as 
inchoate organisms, capable of attaining in-
dependence only subject to socialisation within 
the family or in education institutions [Qvortrup 
et al. 1994]. Th e ‘new sociology of childhood’, 
by contrast, placed the individual personality of 
the child and his / her personal interests at the 
centre of scholarly investigation. Despite the 
signifi cant impact of these discussions, their 
central presuppositions remain to a signifi cant 
degree controversial [Lancy 2012], and some 
scholars question how far one can modify or 
mitigate the empowerment of the person 
directing research relative to the child (i.e. 
adjust the adult perspective) [Dudenkova 2014], 
and, indeed, whether modifi cation or mitigation 
may be possible in the fi rst place.
The focus on child-centred perceptions in 
academic work goes in parallel with the drive 
to overcome discrimination against children 
and to acknowledge their social agency. On the 
one hand, awareness of social processes in the 
present day enhances attention to children’s 
culture, yet on the other, this can provoke 
accusations of undue sensitivity to the prevailing 
ideological moods of the present. And criticism 
of this order is often well-founded, since 
adherence to the tenets of the new sociology 
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oft en fails to go beyond empty gesticulation. Unlike gender studies or 
women’s studies, the study of childhood still oft en presents children 
as the passive objects of acculturation — as observers or those who 
enact the ideas of others, or, on the other hand, consumers.
The drive to explain the conceptual foundations of children’s 
subjectivity is fraught with methodological problems. Th e adoption 
of methods that allow direct contact with children is likely to run 
into severe diffi  culties — legal, institutional, psychological, ethical, 
among others. If the material used is, say, memoirs by adults of their 
experiences in childhood, or on the other hand, texts written by 
children themselves (diaries, letters, and so on), then sources of this 
kind oft en inspire scepticism and arguments about their likely lack 
of objectivity, and / or doubts about the capacity of children to create 
texts that are free from the ideological and discursive models off ered 
by the world of adults.
In the context of these discussions, participants were asked to 
consider the following questions:
Is it possible to overcome the power asymmetry between researchers 
and their subjects in the study of childhood, to halt the process by 
which researchers endow children with their own subjectivity, or at 
the very least to reduce the gulf between researchers and the objects 
of their studies?
In which areas (disciplinary, thematic, etc.) of the study of childhood 
is it legitimate or requisite to accommodate the ‘voice’ or ‘perspective’ 
of children themselves? In which does this endeavour strike you as 
dubious or problematic? What value does a child-centred approach 
hold for your own investigations?
Where, in your view, should one see the relation between the attention 
to children’s subjectivity in academic work and the public 
acknowledgement of children’s agency as political and legal subjects?
Which research materials and methods of investigation / analytical 
instruments facilitate understandings of children’s culture that are 
unmediated by adult perceptions and representations?
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ANDY BYFORD
Studying Th ose Who Study Children: 
Children’s Subjectivity between 
Epistemology and Ethics
1. Children’s subjectivity
as an epistemological problem
My own research into the history of scientifi c 
approaches to the child in late imperial Russia 
and the early Soviet Union does not involve 
work on or with children as subjects, nor is it 
motivated by an ambition to account for their 
subjectivity, perspective, voice, agency or 
worldview. However, my topic does prompt the 
question of what kinds of relationship pertain 
between researchers and children as their 
research subjects and / or objects of study. Th e 
period that I focus on (1880–1930s) was indeed 
dominated by an emphasis on problems of 
development and socialisation that the ‘new 
sociology of childhood’ seeks to distance itself 
from. However, as the introduction to this 
‘Forum’ rightly highlights, the ‘new sociology 
of childhood’ is not entirely clear about what 
precisely is entailed in its own revision of the 
relationship between the ‘new’ scholars of child-
hood and their subject(s).
Th e problem at hand is not simply one of me-
tho dology. Key to understanding what is at 
stake is to see that the relationship between 
science  /  scholarship on children  /  childhood 
and children as subjects / objects of study exists 
simultaneously on two distinct, yet strategically 
interlaced, planes — the ethical and the 
epistemological. It could be argued, in fact, that 
the principal mark of distinction of the ‘new 
sociology of childhood’ is its (broadly Fou-
cauldian) insistence on keeping epistemology 
and ethics inseparable when studying children. 
Its main, historic, contribution to the debate is 
that, in childhood studies, ethics and epistemo-
logy are now pretty much hardwired and it is 
very diffi  cult to imagine them being prised away 
from one another any time soon. Put slightly 


















s children’s subjecthood, which pervades contemporary historical, 
anthropological and sociological explorations of childhood, stems 
from an epistemology that is in a fundamental way shaped by an 
ethical ‘dominant’. And this interlacing of ethics and epistemology 
is clearly in evidence also in the assumptions embedded in the four 
questions guiding this ‘Forum’.
However, it is important not to forget that the problem of ‘children’s 
subjectivity in scholarly work on childhood’, as posed by this 
‘Forum’, remains an epistemological problem. Indeed, Q1 about the 
‘asymmetry of power’ is clearly about the asymmetry of knowledge-
power. Q2 on the child’s ‘perspective’ ultimately concerns the status 
of this ‘perspective’ in a particular knowledge economy — for what 
is the child’s ‘perspective’ here if not a metaphor for the child-
subject’s ‘knowledge’, which is made distinct from, but also placed 
in relation to, knowledge produced by the researcher. For sure, as 
Q3 implies, the epistemological status of the child-subject’s ‘know-
ledge’ is inherently tied to the (politically and legally framed) moral 
status of ‘the child’ in a given society at a given time in history; and 
the latter can, in certain contexts, imply a  signifi cant elevation in 
status of the child-subject’s ‘knowledge’. However, there is still 
usually an assumption that such ‘knowledge’ (whether framed in 
experiential or cognitive terms) is not easy to fi t within the regime 
of rationality in which scientifi c / scholarly knowledge is embedded 
by default and on which its dominant position in the wider know-
ledge economy ultimately depends. Yet when children’s subjectivity 
is turned into something that science / scholarship needs to account 
for, this essentially becomes a problem of translating the child-
subject’s ‘knowledge’ into structures of knowledge recognised as 
those of science / scholarship. What I am referring to here are not 
the various means of ‘objectification’ through which science  / 
scholarship so oft en ends up annulling the subjectivity of the child 
(that which the ‘new sociology of childhood’ is usually quite eff ective 
in denouncing). Rather, what I have in mind when invoking the 
operation of ‘translation’ is the epistemological problem of ‘me-
diation’ as expressed in Q4: if the child-subject’s ‘knowledge’ can 
never be accessed in ‘unmediated’ form, then science / scholarship 
is faced with the task of, fi rstly, identifying ‘materials’ (sources, 
objects, etc.) that would serve as necessary ‘mediators’; and secondly, 
devising special analytical and interpretative approaches that would 
perform the required ‘translation’ of the child-subject’s ‘knowledge’ 
into the rational discourse of science  /  scholarship whereby the 
desired ‘understanding’ would be achieved.
What I propose to do in the remainder of my response to this 
‘Forum’ is to refl ect, for the sake of illustration, on one particular 
domain of the study of children and childhood where the interest 
of scholars from the past, namely those at the forefront of early 
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twentieth-century Russo-Soviet child science, and the interest of 
present-day historians and anthropologists of childhood (especially 
those studying ‘children’s culture’) would appear to intersect. Th e 
case in question is the study of that which children produce or create, 
and this precisely as an example of ‘materials’ that research on 
children often views as a particularly important ‘mediator’ of 
children’s subjectivities.
2. Children’s ‘outputs’ as an object of study
What I have in mind here is almost anything that is produced by 
the children themselves, possibly but not necessarily ‘spon-
taneously’ — whether as part of play (free or guided), educational 
exercise, labour activity, medical therapy or scientifi c experiment. 
Typically, the materials in question include children’s drawings, art 
and craft  items, children’s writings (essays, diaries, poems); but 
potentially also theatrical and musical performances, for instance. 
Th e provisional term that I shall use to refer to all of the above is 
children’s ‘output’. Th e English word ‘output’ is conveniently vague, 
expandable and neutral (and I have deliberately placed it in inverted 
commas to reinforce the idea that, as a concept, it should remain 
tactically open). Th e Russian term that is commonly used in this 
context is tvorchestvo (i.e. children’s ‘creative output’, also implying 
the more general notions of ‘creation’ and ‘creativity’). Tvorchestvo, 
however, connotes a child that is an a priori ‘creator’, which might 
not, in fact, be the role that the child is, in a given situation, per-
forming as producer of a particular ‘output’. For sure, in many 
contexts, children’s ‘outputs’ are, or at least can be, interpreted as 
manifestations of more or less spontaneous ‘creativity’. But at other 
times emphasis might be on the ‘output’ as an outcome of productive 
rather than creative labour (an example of detskiy trud ‘children’s 
labour’ rather than detskoe tvorchestvo ‘children’s creative work’). 
There are also numerous contexts in which a  given ‘output’ is 
essentially a response to a stimulus or ‘input’ of some kind (peda-
gogical, experimental, diagnostic, therapeutic).
‘Outputs’ produced by a child can, of course, be analysed as saying 
something about the concrete child who has produced them (their 
personality, level of cognitive development, subjective worldview). 
However, rather more oft en scholarship makes them speak about 
‘the child’ or ‘childhood’ in general; or about some particular 
subcategory of child (children with a  mental disability, ‘peasant 
children’, ‘street children’, children belonging to a  specifi c ethnic 
minority group, children of a particular age group); or indeed about 
a historically and culturally specifi c childhood (e.g. ‘Soviet child-
hood’). Yet children’s ‘outputs’ need not necessarily be functions of 
the study of ‘the child’ or ‘childhood’ per se; they can serve as 
empirical material for the study of (the development / evolution of) 













s ‘humanity’ or ‘the mind’ (including the development of specifi c 
mental functions, such as, say, memory). Th us, precisely what is at 
stake when scholars study children’s ‘outputs’ can be epistemologically 
hugely diverse, which means that it is essential to look quite closely 
at how specifi c bodies of science / scholarship, working in concrete 
scientifi c-intellectual, sociocultural and politico-historical contexts, 
treat children’s ‘outputs’ as research material.
3. Th e study of children’s ‘outputs’ in early twentieth-century
Russo-Soviet child science
In early twentieth-century Russo-Soviet child science, collecting and 
analysing children’s ‘outputs’ was certainly recognised as one among 
its many ‘methods’. Both Russia’s prerevolutionary child study 
movement and early-Soviet pedology were highly heterogenous 
fi elds, assembling a diversity of occupational priorities, disciplinary 
agendas and theoretical perspectives. Child science was commonly 
presented as a necessarily eclectic ensemble of topics and methods, 
each of which was needed to understand ‘the child’ as an exceptionally 
complex object of study. Th is was very much the understanding of 
child science promoted by the psychologist N. A. Rybnikov (1880–
1961) — a key fi gure at the Central Pedological Institute in Moscow 
in the early Soviet era. In one of his early overviews of pedological 
research Rybnikov listed ‘methods of studying products of child 
creativity’, alongside also the study of ‘children’s drawings’ and even 
their ‘literary creativity’ [Rybnikov 1922: 4, 24–5, 31]. He generally 
assumed that such ‘outputs’ should be systematically assembled into 
large corpora that would then be analysed in various ways, mostly 
by identifying patterns and regularities.
From the perspective of psychology, which dominated early 
twentieth-century child science, it was assumed that what I am calling 
here children’s ‘outputs’ could serve as a potential point of access to 
the inner psychic life of the child, which otherwise lay ‘hidden’ from 
view, given that one could not rely on a child’s ‘introspection’ 
(samonablyudenie) — the only unmediated way of accessing ‘inner’ 
psychic life according to psychological orthodoxy of the era. Although 
it was assumed that collections of children’s ‘outputs’ could serve as 
repositories of data on any number of questions about the child’s 
psyche, psychologists hoped that this material could provide insight 
especially into the child’s emotional states and also their imagination — 
i.e. those subjective parts of the psyche that the otherwise dominant
objective methods of experimental psychology, which focused mostly 
on measuring sensory and cognitive functions, found more diffi  cult
to access and analyse.
However, collecting, analysing and interpreting ‘outputs’ produced 
by children never achieved the prominence that objective methodo-
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logies, such as mental tests, surveys or diary-based observations, 
enjoyed in Russo-Soviet child science. Most commonly, children’s 
‘outputs’ were treated as pieces of ‘raw data’ collected in the context 
of broader programmes of research that otherwise foregrounded 
observation and experimentation as their core methodologies. For 
example, a parent, teacher or psychologist observing a child in some 
educational or playtime context would commonly keep and archive 
what the child produced in some activity (whether spontaneously 
or under instruction). Th is would usually be treated as a piece of 
evidence complementing what was recorded in the diary of objective 
observation. An ‘output’ might also be prompted from the child in 
the context of some experiment (e.g. a drawing as part of a test); or 
it could sometimes be treated as analogous to a survey response (e.g. 
an essay requiring the child to refl ect on their subjective ‘ideals’).
Yet the study of ‘products of children’s creativity’ in and of them-
selves did not, in practice, develop into a  particularly signifi cant 
sub-area of pedological research at the time. Th e reason for this is 
not that children’s subjectivity was being denied or ignored, but that 
scholars generally struggled to fi nd ways of ‘translating’ the various 
‘outputs’ that they were encountering and collecting in the process 
of empirical research into something that would be scientifi cally 
meaningful and relevant to them. Nonetheless, there was one 
particular type of ‘output’ — namely children’s drawings — where 
such ‘translation’ was in fact performed with a  certain degree of 
success, which is why this subdomain of research into children’s 
‘outputs’ saw greater expansion than the rest.
4. Th e study of children’s drawings as the study
of the child’s distinctive mode of ‘knowing’
One of the key reasons why the study of children’s drawings assumed 
pride of place among the study of children’s ‘outputs’ was that it 
was perceived as potentially providing an answer to the distinctive 
ways in which children ‘knew’ the world. Scholars saw children’s 
drawings as a source that integrated two — in principle separate but 
in fact vitally intertwined — questions that seemed crucial to 
grasping the foundations of human knowledge: the distinctive nature 
of a) children’s perception of the world and b) their representation 
of this world by symbolic means. Drawings appeared to bring the 
two together and the core assumption shaping research in this 
domain was that the development of drawing as a form of symbolic 
work went hand in hand with the development of perception itself.
Perception was a major, classical topic of psychology of this era, 
going back to the discipline’s roots in empiricist philosophy and its 
interest in how the human mind knew the world; the topic remained 
important in lab-based experimental psychology, shaped as it was 













s by experimental physics and physiology. Th e core assumption of 
child science, though, was that children perceived the world 
differently to adults and children’s drawings were expected to 
provide clues about this. One infl uential theory of how children’s 
perception diff ered from those of adults, which had emerged in the 
early twentieth century, was the concept of the ‘eidetic mind’ — the 
idea that young children formed particularly vivid, ‘photographic’ 
mental impressions (something that also governed the way their 
memory worked in early stages of development). Eidetism was 
assumed to be a characteristic of the minds not just of children but 
also of ‘primitive’ peoples, and this connection was, crucially, made 
precisely by drawing parallels between how children and ‘the 
primitives’ visually represented the world in their respective artwork.
Vital to child science foregrounding drawing among children’s 
‘outputs’ was also that this activity appeared, on the face of it, to 
require minimal external support as children seemed to engage in 
it fairly spontaneously, just grabbing a pencil or paints and doodling 
or colouring from a  very early age. Drawing thereby signifi cantly 
contrasted other forms of creative or productive ‘output’, almost all 
of which was contingent on the child being taught quite complex 
skills, from craftwork to writing. In some respects, drawing as 
symbolic activity was understood as closest to speech, if not even 
more basic and ‘primitive’, more similar to gesture, allowing 
researchers to study what the neuropsychiatrist V.  M.  Bekhterev 
called ‘symbolic refl exes’. However, Bekhterev’s own paradigm of 
understanding all behaviour in terms of associational reflexes 
(sochetatelnye refl eksy) also implied the need to incorporate into the 
analysis of children’s symbolic work even the littlest external stimuli 
(such as introducing a pencil to a child or demonstrating to them 
how to hold it).
But where the study of children’s drawings became really interesting 
to researchers was when drawing was used not simply as a source 
for studying structures of perception or ‘symbolic refl exes’ in their 
own right, but where the two could be shown to be part of the very 
same underlying structures of ‘knowing’. Particularly controversial 
in this context became the issue of perspectival perception: namely, 
the question of the mind decoding an image that contained 
perspective. Already in the prerevolutionary era Bekhterev and his 
followers analysed collections of young children’s drawings in order 
to show how these developed from strokes (shtrikhi) to squiggles 
(karakuli) to simple representations (e.g. an irregular circle with 
a dash or two, standing for almost anything) to increasingly more 
diff erentiated forms, with the introduction of perspective, crucially, 
featuring as something of an endpoint in the narrative of the 
development of drawing in children [Boldyreva 1913: 28–9]. 
The  latter might appear as a  matter of normatively enforcing 
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culturally specifi c ‘adult’ mental structures as a teleological goal of 
ontological development; but for Bekhterev as neuroscientist, the 
ability to code and decode perspective served simply as a marker 
that showed that the brain had developed to a  particular level of 
neural complexity that was not in evidence in younger children.
However, the problem of perspective resurfaced in the late 1920s 
when a  follower of Bekhterev, T.  N.  Baranova, a  psychologist 
working in Tashkent, documented, controversially, that rural Uzbeks 
seemed unable to ‘see’ (i.e. properly decode) perspective [Baranova 
1929]. Baranova attributed this to her research subjects’ religiously-
infl uenced insulation from visual culture as such, i.e. to the fact that 
they apparently never encountered figurative images in their 
environment and would have been culturally discouraged from 
engaging in visual representation more generally. Th is fi nding was 
later taken up by Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria as a potentially 
important confirmation of their cultural-historical theory of 
development, which argued that development depended on the 
acquisition of symbolic tools from the social environment [Lamdan, 
Yasnitsky 2016]. Crucial here was that it was not only the development 
of drawing as symbolic behaviour that required mediation from 
outside (which was something to be expected), but that the 
development of perception itself, i.e. of mental structures through 
which the world is ‘known’, depended on such cultural mediation 
as well.
It was at this point, however, that ‘subjecthood’ entered the scene, 
although not the subjecthood of children but of Soviet nationalities. 
In the context of the early 1930s’ cultural revolution, the above 
studies were soon interpreted as chauvinistically claiming that some 
of the Soviet nationalities were culturally ‘backward’, even ‘primitive’. 
Th e pedologists who made such arguments were swift ly denounced 
and the topic of ‘perspective’ eff ectively became taboo. However, 
this did not prevent scholars continuing to study the drawings of 
children from ethnic minority groups, so long as this did not imply 
allegations of civilizational ‘backwardness’. In fact, in a 1935 study 
of the drawings of the children of Siberian Evenki, carried out by 
psychologist A.  M.  Schubert, the images analysed were still being 
associated with eidetic perception, as well as with the art of aboriginal 
peoples from across the world. However, the emphasis of this study 
was now on the superior aesthetic value of these drawings [Schubert 
1935]. In fact, the drawings in question were promoted as testimonies 
of what appeared to be unusually advanced skills of representing 
objects that formed part of these children’s distinctive environment 
(e.g. reindeer). Crucial here was that these drawings were attributed 
forms of universal value, both in terms of their aesthetic worth and 
as modes of ‘knowing’, given the ‘accuracy’ with which the Evenki 
children represented the reality that surrounded them.













s 5. Children’s ‘outputs’ as evidence of educability:
A diff erent kind of ethical ‘dominant’
Th e value that we invest in children’s ‘outputs’ as objects of study 
is indeed crucial to understanding how particular ‘outputs’ become 
treated as the prized ‘mediators’ of children’s subjectivities. Crucially, 
though, this value varies both culturally and historically. In late 
imperial and early Soviet Russia, children’s testimonies were mainly 
valued in terms of how well the children producing them responded 
to external stimuli in the context of particular programmes of guided 
development (whether as part of progressive education, defectological 
therapy or systems of resocialisation). In other words, children’s 
‘outputs’ were essentially treated as a mark of ‘achievement’. In fact, 
very oft en, the key purpose of collecting children’s ‘outputs’, and 
even generating them in the fi rst place, was for the sake of publicly 
displaying them in pedagogical museums or special exhibitions. And 
most commonly, the ‘achievement’ on display was not straight-
forwardly that of the children who produced the ‘outputs’, but of 
the institutions in which they were being educated or cared for. Yet 
at the same time, these ‘outputs’ were also intended as demonstrations 
of something pertaining to the children themselves — namely their 
educability. Indeed, the ‘outputs’ that went on display were almost 
always by those whose educability was actually in doubt — ‘the 
diffi  cult’, ‘the defective’, ‘the delinquent’. Th is also meant that, even 
as ‘achievements’, such ‘outputs’ were by default deemed inferior to 
standard forms of academic output of a more intellectual kind. Th e 
association of arts-and-craft s outputs with manual work refl ected 
a strong class bias, which arguably persisted into the Soviet Union, 
despite the nominal reversal of class hierarchies aft er the revolution. 
For sure, early Soviet educational reformists sought to normalise 
learning through doing and making, as better suited to the new body 
politic of workers and peasants, in contrast to learning through the 
logocentric methods of reading and writing, associated with the 
values of the bourgeois intelligentsia. Nonetheless, the ideal outcome 
of Bolshevik ‘labour education’ was ultimately meant to become 
a  hybrid of the two — a person ‘of deep culture, but with work-
callused hands’ [Malinin, Fradkin 1993: 137].
Crucial to note in all of this, though, is that to foreground children’s 
‘educability’ as the key framework for interpreting children’s 
‘outputs’ need not be tantamount to the repressive subordination of 
children’s subjectivity to a set of normative pedagogical structures 
and patterns of development ultimately determined and governed 
by ‘adults’. It also does not mean that children thereby automatically 
become ‘inchoate organisms, capable of attaining independence only 
subject to socialisation’ (to quote from the introductory text to the 
‘Forum’). Rather, what it means is that, in the early twentieth 
century, the interest in specifi cally children’s ‘outputs’ was governed 
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by a  diff erent kind of ethical ‘dominant’ — not the obligation to 
emancipate ‘the child’ as a  ‘subject’ (as demanded by today’s 
dominant ideology), but by an ethics (intimately tied to the project 
of modernity) that was rooted in the obligation to elevate the child 
to an ideal of humanity associated with ‘civilisation’ and ‘culture’.
6. In lieu of a conclusion
My response to the ‘Forum’ questions has evidently not been an attempt 
to answer them as such. What I have sought to do is ‘unpack’ some of 
the dilemmas embedded in them from the perspective of my own 
research interests and fi ndings. What I would like to fi nish with, though, 
is by suggesting the following: if we genuinely want to shed light on 
children’s ‘subjectivity’ as a both ethical and epistemological problem, 
it is, in my view, vital to study the study of children, and to do so in 
historical perspective, ideally through an interdisciplinary combination 
of historical, sociological, anthropo logical and philosophical approaches. 
What I am essentially advo cating here is an approach to knowledge-
production in the fi eld of childhood studies that would be broadly akin 
to what ‘science and technology studies’ have developed in relation to 
‘science’ more generally. Th is would, I believe, introduce an in my view 
essential form of refl exivity into childhood studies that could help 
scholars cut through some of the epistemic knots in which the fi eld 
appears to have gotten entangled (not least in its valiant eff orts to 
conjoin epistemology with ethics).
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